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Hess: Negligence--Turntable Doctrine--Explosives
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
NEGLIGENCE-TURNTABLE D0CTRINF--EXPLOSIVES. Plaintiff's
decedent, aged eleven years, in company with other boys of like
age, while playing on property of the defendants, were requested
to bring powder from the storehouse of the defendant to load on
cars, this being the duty of the servant of the defendant, R, who
made the request. While complying, one of the kegs was bursted,
of which fact R was notified, and replied that it was all right; the
boys picked up some of the powder, crossed the bridge nearby, to
other lands of the defendant, and while throwing the powder on a
fire there, plaintiff's decedent received burns from which he died.
The court, in imposing liability on the defendant, says, "The law
charges one possessing powder with knowledge that it is attractive to immature children, who may be expected to meddle with
it; the law imposes on possessor of powder highest degree of care
to protect children fiom injury where powder is accessible to
them; failure of possessor of powder to exercise highest degree of
care to protect children from injury will impose liability for injury". Wellman v. Fordson Coal Company et at., 143 S. E. 160
(W. Va. 1928).
The language of the case may be misinterpreted as a reversal
of earlier cases repudiating the turntable doctrine, Ritz v. City of
Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262, 31 S. E. 993; Utermohlen v. Boggs Run
Company, 50 W. Va. 457, 40 S. E. 410; Simmons v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Railwa~y Company, 97 W. Va. 104, 124 S. E. 503, 36 A.
L. R. 104) ; but an examination of the case shows that the turntable doctrine is not applicable here, for the following reasons:
(1) The turntable doctrine arpplies to cases where the child, were
it not for the invitation implied from the attractiveness of the
instrument or agency, would have been a trespasser, 20 R. C. L.
79-81; United Zinc Company v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 36 A. L. R.
28; while in the principal case the children were invitees. (2) The
instrument or agency causing the harm, in the turntable cases,
must have its operation on the child before he trespassed. United
Zinc Company v. Britt, supra; Hayko v. Colorado and Utah Coal
Company, 77 Colo. 143, 235 Pac. 373, 29 Law Notes 154 (1925) ;
McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401, 100 N. E. 168; St. Louis etc.
Railroad Company v. Bell, 81 Ill. 76; Hardy v. Pacific Railroad
Company, 266 Fed. 860; Troglia v. Butts, etc., Company, 270 Fed.
75. Indeed, the case of Powers v. Haarlow, 53 Mich. 507, 19 N. IN.
257, 51 Am. Rep. 154, quoted by the court in the principal case,
being a case like the present where the children were rightfully
-present by invitation, is not authority in support of the turntable
doctrine. 36 A. L. R. 85.
The basis of the decision in the principal case would seem to
be negligence, since these children were invitees. Negligence is a
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relative term, and implies a non-observance or omission to perform
a duty which is prescribed by law, or which arises from the situation of the parties and circumstances which surround the transaction. Burdick, Law of Torts, 509; Sias v. Rochiester Railway, 169
N. Y. 118, 62 N. E. 132, 56 L. R. A. 580; Dobbins v. Mis''ouri,
K. & T. Railway Company, 91 Tex. 60, 41 S. W. 62, 38 L. R. A.
573, 66 Am. St. Rep. 856. Hence, if the act is one which the actor,
as a man of ordinary prudence, could foresee might naturally or
probably produce the injury complained of, there is negligence.
Coley v. Statesville, 121 N. C. 301, 28 S. E. 482; Fowikes v.
Southern Railway Company, 96 Va. 742, 32 S. E. 464; Scheffer
v. Railroad Company, 105 U. S. 249. This rule is supported and
followed in cases, like the present, involving explosives. The NitroGlycerine Case, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 524, 21 L. Ed. 206; 11 R. C. L.
665, 666-667; Mills v. Central of Georgia Railroad Company, 140
Ga. 181, 78 S. E. 816, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1098 and note. Obviously
then, the foreseeability of this injury determines the liability of
the defendants, and since the test must be applied to each individual case, the only question in the principal case was whether the
servant of the defendant, as an ordinary prudent man, could foresee an injury of this character. This question was left to the
jury, Blankenship v. Ethel Coal Company, 69 W. Va. 74, 70 S. E.
863; 22 R. C. L. 148; and the jury found contrary to the contention of the defendant. The court apparently found no reason to
disturb this finding.
-L. C. ] bpss.

BiLs AND NoTs-EvIDENcE.-Agent signed notes "A, trustee",
Held, that agent was not liable to payee if he could show that
payee knew that be was acting, and executed the instrument, in
a representative capacity. Holder, charged with notice, could
maintain assumpsit against the principal without joining the
agent, and show by parol evidence that debt, as evidenced by the
note, was in fact the principal's, and that it was so understood
between the agent and payee. Huntington Finance Company v.
Young, 143 S. E. 102 (W. Va. 1928).
It is well settled law in West Virginia that an agent is not
liable to the payee if he can show that the note was in fact that
of the principal and it was so understood between the agent and
payee. Clark, Trustee, v. Talbott, 72 W. Va. 46, 77 S. B. 523.
There is a square conflict of authority as to the effect of §20 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law. One line of cases holds that the
express language of §20 makes the agent*personally liable. Citizens
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